Society generally is ambivalent about the Society generally is ambivalent about the responsibilities and rights of its young responsibilities and rights of its young people. Although the past few decades have people. Although the past few decades have seen a social and judicial shift away from seen a social and judicial shift away from the power of parents to control their the power of parents to control their children, towards children's rights and children, towards children's rights and parental responsibility, this trend is not parental responsibility, this trend is not sufficiently developed in relation to chilsufficiently developed in relation to children with mental health problems for one dren with mental health problems for one to be confident that the rights of such to be confident that the rights of such young people are protected. young people are protected.
The authority to confine and comThe authority to confine and compulsorily treat mentally disordered citizens pulsorily treat mentally disordered citizens derives from police powers and the derives from police powers and the parens parens patriae patriae power of the state. However, the power of the state. However, the distinction between the two is not always distinction between the two is not always evident when considering how the courts evident when considering how the courts deal with children and young people with deal with children and young people with mental disorders, because of the strong mental disorders, because of the strong element of paternalism that guides courts element of paternalism that guides courts in these cases. According to UK law, in these cases. According to UK law, children of 10 years old are fully accountchildren of 10 years old are fully accountable and responsible for their criminal able and responsible for their criminal activities; in contrast, a 17-year-old may activities; in contrast, a 17-year-old may not be able to refuse a minor medical not be able to refuse a minor medical procedure or have a tattoo. Bridge (1997) procedure or have a tattoo. Bridge (1997) draws attention to this dilemma of draws attention to this dilemma of acknowledging and respecting the child's acknowledging and respecting the child's autonomy, while at the same time having autonomy, while at the same time having to care and take responsibility for the child. to care and take responsibility for the child. A parent's power to confine and treat a A parent's power to confine and treat a child in a psychiatric hospital against the child in a psychiatric hospital against the child's wishes is seen as an extension of child's wishes is seen as an extension of the parent's responsibility to care for the the parent's responsibility to care for the child ( child (Neilsen v. Denmark Neilsen v. Denmark [1989] ). How-[1989] ). However, the tension between these competing ever, the tension between these competing ideas comes to the fore in adolescence as ideas comes to the fore in adolescence as it is at this developmental stage that the it is at this developmental stage that the tensions between the medical and legal tensions between the medical and legal conceptions of the young person's behavconceptions of the young person's behaviour, symptoms, actions and responsibility iour, symptoms, actions and responsibility are brought into the sharpest relief. are brought into the sharpest relief.
Children can be treated for mental disChildren can be treated for mental disorder without their consent. This is true order without their consent. This is true whether or not the child is competent. The whether or not the child is competent. The legal framework for this is made up of a legal framework for this is made up of a patchwork of statutory and case laws mainly patchwork of statutory and case laws mainly formulated without the developmental needs formulated without the developmental needs of the child in mind. Moreover, the particuof the child in mind. Moreover, the particular deficiencies and inconsistencies in service lar deficiencies and inconsistencies in service provision, and the competing pressures on provision, and the competing pressures on services, professionals, families and the services, professionals, families and the child, call for special consideration of the child, call for special consideration of the needs of this vulnerable group. For those of needs of this vulnerable group. For those of us working with children suffering from us working with children suffering from mental disorder, the current reform of the mental disorder, the current reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 offers an opporMental Health Act 1983 offers an opportunity to improve the way in which the needs tunity to improve the way in which the needs of these children are addressed. of these children are addressed.
PROPOSED REFORM OF THE PROPOSED REFORM OF THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 19 83 MENTAL HEALTH ACT 19 83
The Draft Mental Health Bill (Department The Draft Mental Health Bill (Department of Health, 2002) does describe some addiof Health, 2002) does describe some additional safeguards for children who become tional safeguards for children who become subject to compulsory detention or admissubject to compulsory detention or admission under the Act. Parents must be sion under the Act. Parents must be consulted -or at least there will be an obliconsulted -or at least there will be an obligation to consult a parent, or any other pergation to consult a parent, or any other person with parental responsibility for children son with parental responsibility for children up to 16 years old. However, it is proposed up to 16 years old. However, it is proposed that young people aged 16-18 years cannot that young people aged 16-18 years cannot be detained or treated against their will with be detained or treated against their will with parental authority alone, but must be comparental authority alone, but must be compulsorily admitted or treated under a Care pulsorily admitted or treated under a Care and Treatment Order under the new Act. and Treatment Order under the new Act. Therefore it is not adequate for parents to Therefore it is not adequate for parents to consent on their child's behalf, and this is consent on their child's behalf, and this is written in terms of the young person not givwritten in terms of the young person not giving rather than refusing consent (which is siging rather than refusing consent (which is significant in the context of the House of Lords nificant in the context of the House of Lords decision in decision in R. v. Bournewood R. v. Bournewood [1998] ).
[1998]). Moreover, it is suggested that the role of Moreover, it is suggested that the role of the Mental Health Act Commissioner might the Mental Health Act Commissioner might be extended to oversee that the rights of inbe extended to oversee that the rights of informal patients are also protected. However, formal patients are also protected. However, it is unclear how this will be achieved. it is unclear how this will be achieved.
TREATMENT OF MENTAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL DISORDER IN CHILDREN DISORDER IN CHILDREN WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT
It is appropriate that in most cases parents It is appropriate that in most cases parents are empowered to make decisions on behalf are empowered to make decisions on behalf of their children. However, when mental of their children. However, when mental illness is present, intrafamilial relationships illness is present, intrafamilial relationships can become strained to the point that can become strained to the point that decision-making is difficult to achieve. decision-making is difficult to achieve. Within the doctor-patient relationship the Within the doctor-patient relationship the uneven distribution of power further uneven distribution of power further distorts the decision-making process. distorts the decision-making process. Where there is evidence that a child needs Where there is evidence that a child needs to be compulsorily detained and treated to be compulsorily detained and treated under the Mental Health Act 1983, these under the Mental Health Act 1983, these difficulties are compounded. Particularly difficulties are compounded. Particularly in relation to children, the ambiguity within in relation to children, the ambiguity within the Act in the definition of mental disorder, the Act in the definition of mental disorder, risk, dangerousness and inability to selfrisk, dangerousness and inability to selfcare makes it difficult for parents to care makes it difficult for parents to challenge doctors' opinions. challenge doctors' opinions.
Perhaps not surprisingly, psychiatrists Perhaps not surprisingly, psychiatrists often have tried to avoid using compulsory often have tried to avoid using compulsory powers under the Mental Health Act 1983. powers under the Mental Health Act 1983. Reasons for this may be the need to maintain Reasons for this may be the need to maintain collaboration with the child and to avoid collaboration with the child and to avoid perceived stigmatisation resulting from deperceived stigmatisation resulting from detention under the Act (Bridge, 1997) . Howtention under the Act (Bridge, 1997) . However, as Fennell (1992) argues, it is more the ever, as Fennell (1992) argues, it is more the mental illness itself rather than the compulmental illness itself rather than the compulsory admission that leads to the stigma. sory admission that leads to the stigma. Therefore, codes of practice (Department Therefore, codes of practice (Department of Health & Welsh Office, 1999) and of Health & Welsh Office, 1999) and academic commentators may well argue academic commentators may well argue that children with mental disorder should that children with mental disorder should be detained when clinically appropriate, be detained when clinically appropriate, but they also acknowledge that to do so but they also acknowledge that to do so may be 'swimming against the overmay be 'swimming against the overwhelming tide of professional opinion not whelming tide of professional opinion not to use compulsory powers under the 1983 to use compulsory powers under the 1983 Act' . Rather than state that Act' . Rather than state that the Mental Health Act 1983 should be used, the Mental Health Act 1983 should be used, it will be more useful to consider the reasons it will be more useful to consider the reasons why it is not used and more importantly why it is not used and more importantly how the child's welfare and health can be how the child's welfare and health can be promoted more effectively. Significantly, promoted more effectively. Significantly, children who are refusing treatment and children who are refusing treatment and are therefore treated with parental authority are therefore treated with parental authority alone have none of the statutory safeguards alone have none of the statutory safeguards for the protection of their rights (Fennell, for the protection of their rights (Fennell, 1992 . The Mental Health Bill 1992, 1996). The Mental Health Bill adequately addresses none of these issues. adequately addresses none of these issues.
THE LAW AND CONSENT THE LAW AND CONSENT
There exists an apparent inconsistency in There exists an apparent inconsistency in the law, in that young people under 18 the law, in that young people under 18 years old can consent to treatment, but years old can consent to treatment, but cannot refuse in the face of proxy consent cannot refuse in the face of proxy consent by someone with parental responsibility by someone with parental responsibility ( (Re R Re R [1991] ; [1991] ; Re W Re W [1993] ). The Gillick [1993] ( 2 0 0 4 ) , 1 8 4 , 1^2 ( 2 0 0 4 ) , 1 8 4 , 1^2
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Child psychiatry, mental disorder and the law: is a Child psychiatry, mental disorder and the law: is a more specific statutory framework necessary? more specific statutory framework necessary?
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a child is competent to consent to his or her a child is competent to consent to his or her own treatment. Although this imposed a own treatment. Although this imposed a higher standard for the child to meet than higher standard for the child to meet than an adult facing the same decision, clinically an adult facing the same decision, clinically the clarification has been useful. The child the clarification has been useful. The child is expected to understand not only what is expected to understand not only what the treatment involves and the consethe treatment involves and the consequences of consenting, refusing or taking quences of consenting, refusing or taking an alternative course of treatment, but also an alternative course of treatment, but also the wider consequences, including the the wider consequences, including the repercussions on family relationships. If a repercussions on family relationships. If a child is able to understand all this and come child is able to understand all this and come to a reasoned view having considered the to a reasoned view having considered the balance of the arguments for each course balance of the arguments for each course of action, why then is this insufficient for of action, why then is this insufficient for the child to be able to consent to or refuse the child to be able to consent to or refuse the treatment? Refusal might carry with it the treatment? Refusal might carry with it more serious and far-reaching consemore serious and far-reaching consequences (Pearce, 1994) ; it might require a quences (Pearce, 1994) ; it might require a higher order of deliberation and decisionhigher order of deliberation and decisionmaking (McCall-Smith, 1992) ; but if these making (McCall-Smith, 1992) ; but if these hurdles are passed, it would appear illogical hurdles are passed, it would appear illogical to allow a child to consent but not to to allow a child to consent but not to refuse. The decision-making is then taken refuse. The decision-making is then taken by an adult who is not required to consider by an adult who is not required to consider the decision and its implications so deeply. the decision and its implications so deeply. Moreover, neither the European ConMoreover, neither the European Convention on Human Rights nor the Human vention on Human Rights nor the Human Rights Act 1998 has been shown to have Rights Act 1998 has been shown to have any teeth when it comes to protecting the any teeth when it comes to protecting the rights of the child against the wishes of a rights of the child against the wishes of a parent. The current law allows the rights parent. The current law allows the rights of the children themselves to be sidelined of the children themselves to be sidelined or disregarded. In the absence of the courts or disregarded. In the absence of the courts being prepared to consider meaningfully being prepared to consider meaningfully the criteria and circumstances in which a the criteria and circumstances in which a child can refuse treatment (in a Gillick-like child can refuse treatment (in a Gillick-like judgment considering the refusal of treatjudgment considering the refusal of treatment in minors), there is a need for ment in minors), there is a need for statutory clarification. This has wider statutory clarification. This has wider implications than for mental health alone, implications than for mental health alone, and therefore the Mental Health Bill does and therefore the Mental Health Bill does not -and perhaps could not be expected not -and perhaps could not be expected to -address this issue, being drafted with to -address this issue, being drafted with the mental health of adults in mind. the mental health of adults in mind.
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION
The legal framework relating to these The legal framework relating to these vulnerable children, being largely borrowed vulnerable children, being largely borrowed from that for adults, can never fully take from that for adults, can never fully take account of the specific developmental needs account of the specific developmental needs of children, or of the differences, inconsisof children, or of the differences, inconsistencies and, in particular, the multi-agency tencies and, in particular, the multi-agency nature of children's services. These nature of children's services. These deficiencies in the legal framework for the deficiencies in the legal framework for the treatment of children with mental disorder treatment of children with mental disorder cannot be addressed by a simple add-on cannot be addressed by a simple add-on to adult mental health legislation: a more to adult mental health legislation: a more specific statutory framework is necessary. specific statutory framework is necessary. Only then will the law be able to address Only then will the law be able to address adequately the important issues for adequately the important issues for children. The legislation will need to ensure children. The legislation will need to ensure the joint planning and shared responsibility the joint planning and shared responsibility for children with mental illness and for children with mental illness and children who are 'difficult to place' because children who are 'difficult to place' because of their high-risk behaviour between social of their high-risk behaviour between social services and health and education. It will services and health and education. It will need to confront the thorny issues of how need to confront the thorny issues of how the child may be subject to de facto detenthe child may be subject to de facto detention, and integrate sufficient safeguards to tion, and integrate sufficient safeguards to protect the child's own rights. In the protect the child's own rights. In the current climate in which children's services current climate in which children's services operate, this more multi-agency approach operate, this more multi-agency approach would have the added advantage of openwould have the added advantage of opening the whole process to greater external ing the whole process to greater external scrutiny. There is the additional safeguard scrutiny. There is the additional safeguard for the child provided by the involvement for the child provided by the involvement of other professionals who are able to take of other professionals who are able to take a different and perhaps broader view of the a different and perhaps broader view of the child's best interests. child's best interests.
The Mental Health Bill marks a shift The Mental Health Bill marks a shift away from caring for people with mental away from caring for people with mental disorder towards controlling them. The disorder towards controlling them. The Children Act 1989 was an attempt to Children Act 1989 was an attempt to address the needs of children by bringing address the needs of children by bringing together the laws relating to their care and together the laws relating to their care and their rights. In so doing there was an their rights. In so doing there was an acknowledgement that these issues could acknowledgement that these issues could only be addressed by a specific statutory only be addressed by a specific statutory framework. It is time to rethink how the framework. It is time to rethink how the law relating to children with mental law relating to children with mental disorder can most adequately meet their disorder can most adequately meet their needs. needs.
